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in this paper i would like to deal with Scheler’s emotional ethics and its relationship with 
a possible ontological foundation. i want to address the theme of values and acts, asking 
whether they are rooted in being or whether they possess their status autonomously, and 
where they obtain their legality and consistency from.
I will face first of all Scheler’s original discovery of the special status of value as 
intentional object and the correlated human capacity of grasping it, realizing the 
corrected order of values and fulfilling the “moral good”. 
in the end, as i will underline how Scheler’s gain lies in the avoidance of reducing the 
foundation of ethics to a transcendental deduction or to an inductive-empirical method, i 
will stress the problem of his personalistic ethic, in the attempt to hand over to the person 
the whole discretion of letting values emerge and affirm in the history.
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in this article i would like to explore scheler’s account of the role of emo-
tion in ethics and its possible ontological foundation. in particular, i will 
address the theme of value and act, asking whether they are rooted in being 
or whether they possess their status autonomously, and where they obtain 
their legality and consistency from.
I will start with Scheler’s affirmation in his Promotionsschrift, that “we see 
an unclosed rift between thinking and wanting, knowing and acting, good 
and true”1.In this work he distinguishes these two distinct fields of human 
experience: on one side, the scientific method, the world of Kantian pure 
reason2, that due to its lack of theological character can only improve the 
precision and exactness of mathematical knowledge. on the other side lies 
the ineradicable world of ethical principles, correlated with the human 
need for “moral laws” that can be set as goalsto regulate practical behav-
ior. according to scheler, this need emerged and paradoxically strength-
ened as science became increasingly successful, thus seeming to eliminate 
the need for ethical necessity.
scheler notes how modernity and the positive sciences introduced a ten-
dency to reduce this second field, represented by cultural life and the 
existence of values, to the first one. Most prominent in this development 
was the rise of modern psychology, which in claiming the univocity of 
psychological, genetic laws, removed first the independence and dignity 
of precise areas of human experience (art and morality), and second the 
autonomous role of that special cognitive capacity proper to the person, 
namely feeling.
The same tendency can be seen in Kant’s thought: even though he went 
one step further with his anti-psychological polemic and the recognition 
of the transcendental function of spiritual faculties, he made the mistake 
of relegating practical reason to the sphere of pure reason, reducing moral 
knowledge to an inner duty of intellectual nature3.
in Beiträge, scheler stresses the different activities remaining in Kant’s ter-
1 “Zwischen denken und Wollen, Wissen und handeln, guten und Wahren, eine unschliessbarekluft 
sehen” gw1, 11.
2 Scheler’s value’s theory leads namely from Kant’s critique to a pure formal ethic, where the 
morality pours out from a pure fact of the reason, formal and empty, lacking any intentionality to 
experience’s contents (“Kant sieht offenbart den Tatsachenkreis nicht, auf den sich eine apriorische ethik, 
wie jede erkenntnis, zu stützen hat” GW2, 67). Scheler contrasts indeed a material ethics, where values, 
although a priori, are feelable phenomena and exist thanks to a value’s bearer. 
3 cf.gw1, 57.
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minology, of pure and practical reason: while the first presents just an orga-
nizing power, that through transcendental categories rearranges and gives 
form to the chaos of perceptible material, operating therefore in a scientific 
way, the second carries out the task of partially suppressing the givenness of 
particular drives, exhibiting thence a plus of activity. The power of the prac-
tical reason consists in another “spiritual happening”4, which does not mean 
to gain an exact knowledge of being, but rather to set goals that can regulate 
and guide actions. With this statement, Scheler wants to take distance from 
the empty concept of the Kantian moral imperative, which presents itself as 
free of any empirical contents, setting a formal law, applicablein any pos-
sible case. Morality is indeed first of all not knowledge or recognition of a 
duty, but a grasping of values, which do not manifest themselves in an intel-
lectual process but in feeling. 
Scheler revaluates the cognitive capacity of the function of feeling, establish-
ing the statute of a new intentional object, value, which represents the area of 
an independent experience, provided with its own laws.
In the Systemathischer Teil of his work, Scheler attempts a definition of the 
concept of value, and what he stresses first is how value resiststo dissolution 
in being5. This goes back to Hermann Lotze’s Logik6, where being valid itself is 
fundamental and thus cannot be deduced from other fields or spheres7.
Scheler affirms that the history of philosophy is replete with attempts to 
deduce being from value and value from mere being. In this regard, he re-
calls Kant’s critique of the traditional ontological proofs for God, where the 
philosopher of Königsberg shows how it is impossible to deduce the reality 
of God from the concept of value of the supreme Being. Scheler explains that 
because something has value, it does not mean that it has to exist, and since 
something exists, it does not mean that it has to have value. “As value does 
notgive a thing existence, so the existence of a thing does not make it more 
valuable”8.
This strict separation between value and being brings Scheler to the task, 
as we have just indicated, of re-establishing the nature of value and its pos-
sible experience, which is of course different from any acts which can “set 
4 Cf. ivi, 59.
5 Cf. ivi, 98.
6 Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) affirms, in the wake of Bolzano, the independence of logic from 
psychology, and its irreducible status to the one of “being”. Furthermore, he anchors the autonomy 
of the reign of logic and of the idealities in the notion of “validity” (Geltung).
7 The problem of the spheres concerns the core of Scheler’s ontology, it states the existence of 
“essence’s regions” (Wesensregionen), which are independent from each other.
8 “Wie der Wert ein Ding nicht existent macht, so macht aber auch die Existenz ein Ding nicht 
wertvoller” GW1, 98 (my translation).
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existence”9. Value remains inaccessible to thought (Denken) and to the intel-
lect (Verstand), as it belongs to the axiological sphere of experience and can 
only be caught through affective perception, feeling (Fühlen).
Values are therefore for Scheler original essential qualities, which can be 
known in this particular essential intuition of the feeling. It is very impor-
tant to understand how for Scheler the feeling of something has an inten-
tional structure, which distinguishes it from mere feeling-states (Gefühl-
szustände): while the latter are sensible localized conditions of our body or 
psychological state (bad or good mood, etc.), not immediately related to an 
object, in the case of feeling-of there is 
“… an original relatedness, a directedness of feeling toward something ob-
jective, namely, values. This kind of feeling is not a dead stare or a factual 
state of affairs that can enter into associative connections or be related to 
them; nor is such feeling a ‘token’. This feeling is a goal-determined move-
ment, although it is by no means an activity issuing forth from a center 
(…). This feeling therefore has the same relation to its value-correlate as 
‘representing’ has to its ‘object’, namely, an intentional relation”10.
Thus, there is a difference between a simple sentiment (pain, sadness, joy), 
which, so to speak, ends in itself, and the cognitive grasping values such 
agreeable-disagreeable, good-evil, beautiful-ugly.
Values are therefore given in the intentional personal act of the intuitive 
feeling, and Scheler – according to the phenomenological principle, which 
says that the sense of a thing discovers itself in the structures of the inten-
tional consciousness –adopts the thesis that the existence of a value, even 
though not depending properly on the acting person, can be realized in the 
fulfillment of this act.
Having said that values are qualities and do not settle in being, but rather 
appear strictly related to the grasping act of the person, it is necessary to 
prove their possible objective status, and in what way the function of a per-
son’s acts can set or collaborate with their ontological status.
9 This is a phenomenological statement, it refers to Husserl’s judgment theory, where he 
speaks about judgment (Realbedeutungen) which sets the existence of individual existing (Dasein). 
This cannot be elaborated here.
10 Scheler, Max, (1973) Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the 
Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, Northwestern University Press, pp 257-58.
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A phenomenological principle affirms that intentional objects do not dis-
solve into the intentional act, but rather revealthemselves in it, retaining 
their ideal, a priori status. That means that they cannot be brought to co-
incide with specific things or goods (Dinge or Güter), remaining immaculate 
from any possible attempt at relativisation. As Scheler affirmed in his course 
on Ethics in Cologne (1921): “if there is – as we believe –an intentional rela-
tionship between feeling and value, then there can also be an a priori value 
theory, independent from goods and independent from the constitution of 
the recognizing being”11. With this assertion Scheler intends to proof the 
particular a prioricharacter of values, i.e. their being objective and not to be 
sought in the web of empirical contingency12.Second, as axiological qualities 
and not just indifferent things like unities, valuesmust be structured in a 
hierarchical rank. In this regard it is now necessary to understand exactly 
what Scheler means by values hierarchy and how it can be realized by the 
comparison with this relation of being higher. In his Cologne course Scheler 
says again: 
“The theory of the hierarchical rank of values builds the crucial part of the 
whole ethic, and represents its last foundation. It has to be a priori, inde-
pendent from the experience of men’s moral actions. The hierarchical rank 
has to be sought among the self values qualities and not among ‘goods’”13.
At first we wish to briefly explain the structure of this rank according to 
Scheler’s theory. This rank is not to be transcendentally deduced or empiri-
cally induced, but it is an immediately evident fact, which makes ethics “the 
science of intuitive experience”14. In his main work, The Formalismus, Scheler 
distinguishes four classes of value, while in the later Cologne course he adds 
another type. Resting securely on The Formalismus’s exposition we want now 
to abide by this last one15:
1. Values of agreeable-disagreeable: the function of sensible feel-
ing corresponds to this class. The respective feeling-states are pleas-
ure and pain.
11 ANA 375 B III, 23, 39 (my translation).
12 Cf. Spader, Peter H. (2002) Scheler’s Ethical Personalism, It’s Logic, Development and Promise, Fordham 
University Press, New York.
13  ANA 375 B III, 98 (my translation).
14 Ivi, 13 (my translation).
15  It has to be underlined that every value’s class corresponds with a precise stratum of the 
emotional life and not just what we generally called “feeling”: the feeling distinguishes itself 
namely in sensible, vital, psychic, spiritual feeling. It exists therefore as a meaningful and 
progressive pattern of levels of affective structures of the person.




Values and the 
moral good
ANNA PIAZZA Universität Erfurt
103
2. Values of utility: Scheler does not comment explicitly on this 
precise category but from his noteshe seems to understand these as 
“civilisation’s values”, related to society as its “noticeability thresh-
old” (Merkbarkeitsschwelle). 
3. Vital values: are correlated with vital feeling, which include all 
modes of the feeling of life (health, illness, weakness, strength,...). Its 
thing-values are such qualities as those encompassed by the noble 
and the vulgar.
4. Spiritual values: are apprehended in functions of spiritual feel-
ings and acts of spiritual preferring, loving, and hating. The main 
types of spiritual values are: beautiful-ugly, right-wrong, cognition 
of truth.
5. Values of the holy and unholy: the very definite condition of 
their givenness is that they appear only in objects given in intention 
as “absolute object”. The feeling-states belonging to this class are 
“blissfulness”, “despair”, and specific reactions in this are “faith” 
and “lack of faith”16.
Now that Scheler’s objective rank of values has been clarified to a certain 
extent, a further question is to understand how it is humanly possible to 
“reflect” and respectthis corrected hierarchy by means of one’s behavior, 
i.e., in his or her understanding of ethics, that is how proper morality can be 
realized by the acting person. 
First it is not of less importance to stress that moral “good” and “evil”, val-
ues which actually do not emerge in the hierarchy, are indeed dependent on 
fulfilling the right values order, making the person an authentic bearer of 
moral values. 
In Formalismus Scheler affirms: 
“The value ‘good’ – in an absolute sense – is the value that appears, by way 
of essential necessity, on the act of realizing the value which (with respect 
to the measure of cognition of that being which realizes it) is the highest. 
The value ‘evil’- in an absolute sense – is the value that appears on the act 
of realizing the lowest value”17.
As Spader comments, this definition allows Scheler to set a relationship be-
tween moral values and all other values, contesting Kant who says that eth-
16  Cf. GW2 122, Form 105 – 10; ANA 375 B III, 12.
17  GW2, 47; Form, 25.
Scheler’S foundation of ethicS
ANNA PIAZZA Universität Erfurt
104
ics is just a content of will18. Faithful to his phenomenological view, Scheler 
claims: “this value appears on the act of willing. It is for this reason that it 
can never be the content of an act of willing. It is located, so to speak, on the 
back of this act, and this by the way of essential necessity; it can therefore 
never be intended in this act”19.
Value as intentional term is thus not something to be created or conceptu-
alized in an active reflection; it is not the object of a previous decision but, 
phenomenologically, gives itself in a passive way, inhering to specific per-
sonal acts. Particularly, in the case of realization of higher values, special 
kinds of acts come into play, which are situated on a more important level of 
the “stratification” of the emotional life, namely the act of preferring, and in 
the case of the realization of lower values, the act of placing after. 
“preferring’ and ‘placing after’ are not conative activities like, say, ‘choos-
ing’, which is based on act of preferring. Nor is preferring (or placing after) 
a purely feeling comportment. It constitutes a special class of emotional 
act-experiences. The proof is that we can ‘choose’, strictly speaking, only 
between actions, whereas we can ‘prefer’ one good to another, good weath-
er to bad, one food to another etc”20.
These two acts, as Scheler asserts in the Cologne course, are “grasping func-
tions” (aufnehmende Funktionen) of emotional and value’s cognitive charac-
ter, possibly definable as attraction and repulsion acts21. They are neither 
a striving (Streben) nor a volitional behavior, but have a discerning task22, 
namely a passive discerning.
Scheler’s solution about the definition of value and its givenness helps to 
point out some observations relating our previous question, i.e., the ontolog-
ical status of value and the role of the person, which we now wish to tackle.
As we have shown, as values possess an ideal objective statue which cannot 
be abolished from any historical statement, they need a tendency of hu-
man affection to come into existence. Values coincide neither with positive 
goods, nor are they norms which can be rationally settled once and for all. 
History, with its changeable “laws of preference”, illustrates this clearly: 
values need the implication of subjectivity, which affirms and promotes the 
content of their ideal. 
18  Cf. Spader 2002, 126.
19  GW2, 48-49; Form,27
20  GW2, 265; Form, 260
21  Cf. Henckmann, Wolfhart (1998) Max Scheler, Verlag C. H. Beck, München, p 120.
22  ANA, 49
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But once we ascertain this objective rank thanks to the “middle’s king-
dom” of the affective intentional relationship – the only place where values 
emerge, so to speak, regardless of the free will of consciousness’s discern-
ment23– we need to better understand how to locate the foundation of value, 
and what it depends on, for, in history, certain values have asserted them-
selves, even though they were not at the top of the objective axiological hi-
erarchy, over other higher values.
As we saw, Scheler’s theory is strictly personalistic: the corrected values 
hierarchy can just be reflected and realized from the acting person. In his 
Cologne course Scheler says: 
“Ethical values are person’s values. Absolute, spiritual feelings adhere to 
the being and so-being (so-sein) of person. Person’s values are the highest 
values and have to be preferred to all the other values. All morality becomes 
efficient for us thanks to persons. The spiritual person is the real good”24
Morality, as observed, can only be generated from the personal preferring 
of higher values, and only by embodying this axiological ideal character, the 
person, carrying a moral exemplarity25, becomes the primary source of val-
ues experience for others. Criticizing an ethical model based on paralyzed 
norms, Scheler claims a right to an individual, personal ethics, which cannot 
overlook the concrete being of a person.
In a section of Formalismus entitled “Microcosm, Macrocosm and the Idea of 
God”, Scheler explains how every singular person represents a microcosm 
of values, a personal order which reflects the precise values which in the 
course of life and circumstances have been experienced, known, followed 
(preferred) and which constitutes the so-called ordo amoris of a person. Sche-
ler does not understand this in the sense of a relativism, where every per-
son, according to their own experience, brings to comprehension just a per-
sonal order of the objective order, but more in the sense of a collaboration 
in solidarity, where the single person (Einzelperson), incarnating his special 
vision or intuition of some values, can promote and be an example for those 
23 According to Scheler, the primary emergence of values in the intentional relationship is the 
conditionfor the pure will to act in the practical world, which in this meaning presents already 
an axiologically structured configuration.
24  ANA, 149 (my translation).
25 Scheler develops a proper theory of the model person. In the Cologne course he lists five 
categories of “types of models”, any of them correspond to a particular class of values. The saint 
is the model in the religious life, the genius in the spiritual life, the hero in the vital sphere, the 
“economy’s leader” in the sphere of utility’s values and the “artist of life”, or “artist of pleasure” 
in the sphere of agreeable. Every particular model realizes a special rank of values, becoming 
possibility of experience and example of those. ANA,120.
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particular values, thus becoming jointly responsible for ethics as a whole26. 
This theory of the exemplarity helps to take a step forward about the ques-
tion of how and in which conditions values emerge in the course of history: 
there are always personal models, especially models who became such, 
thanks to a particular right comprehension of higher values, and, so to 
speak, hold the helm of history. 
“A model is, like a norm, anchored in an evidential value of the person. But 
a model does not pertain to mere action, as is the case with a norm. It per-
tains first of all to a To-Be. One who has a model tends to become similar or 
equal to it, in that he experiences the requirement of the ought-to-be on 
the basis of the value seen in the content of the model person. In addition, 
the individual value-essence of the person who serves as a model is not 
extinguished in the idea of the model, as is the case with a norm, which is 
universal by virtue of its content and validity”27.
So Scheler can affirm, in the Cologne course, that “all the sense of history 
lies in the person”28.
But we want to turn back briefly to our first question, namely, the relation-
ship of values and person to being, in some final considerations about the 
autonomy of the ontological foundation of Scheler’s ethics.
In the first part of the article we saw how values do not have any kind of 
entrenchment in the being of things: the originality of Scheler’s position 
consists namely in the affirmation of the autonomy of spiritual formations 
in the moral world from the logical and cognitive structures of any rational 
knowledge. Scheler’s moral knowledge is not based on an existence’s judg-
ment, it has nothing to do with what can be recognized as true or false; is 
neither based on the capacity of the reason nor on the capacity of the being 
of the things.
The positive of this position consists surely in pointing out the meta-historical 
and meta-ontic necessity of values, which underlines their irreducible and 
therefore objective nature. But if the strength of Scheler’s theory succeeded 
in avoiding reducing the foundation of ethics to a transcendental deduction 
(pure reason) or to an inductive-empirical method (confusion between thing 
26  It is to be noted that certainly every person has necessarily a limited vision of the whole 
axiological rank (Daseinsrelativität), but every person can be a model and can collaborate with the 
whole good, in so far as he realizes higher values despite lower ones. Not every person can be a 
model in Scheler’s way, since a person can also be “morally bad”.
27  GW2, 560; F, 574.
28 ANA, 160.
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and good), the risk is to leave values ungrounded in an ideal world.
Scheler’s solution is to turn back to the person and his immediate and evi-
dent discernment (Fühlen, Einsicht) of the axiological classes plus the moral 
discernment (sittliche Einsicht) of good and evil. But this ontological autono-
my of the moral discernment and the definition of person as a “concrete and 
essential unity of being of acts of different essences” does not maybe suffice 
to establish a precise rank of values where spiritual values are the high-
est and where on that basis the holy resides: Scheler could have proposed a 
stronger definition of person, where his relation to the divine could work 
as the foundation of the correlated rank of values, which by its side finds 
indeed the holy as own basis. That would have been even more essential for 
the fact that the very place where values revealthemselves is, as pointed out, 
precisely an act of the person, namely feeling.
Scheler wanted surely to avoid to fall in an ontologism, like the one of Male-
branche, which he strongly refuses, and we could affirm that the problem of 
the foundation of ethics assumes in him a gnoseological-intentional charac-
ter, but, again, when we speak about classes of acts, it would be necessary to 
precise where the respective acts settle, and whether they have the capacity 
to discover and fulfill the moral world.
As we deepen herein Scheler’s personalistic theory, we now notice that his 
ethics seems to have two tendencies: an attempt to preserve the ontological 
autonomy of morality, without leading it back to an external divine legisla-
tor who would configure ethics as normative or voluntaristic, and the un-
avoidable affirmation of man as a spiritual person, who acts morally since 
he realizes the axiological rank, where the highest value is the holy.
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